

# Informational Ontology

Revision 5k - Mar 2026

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## Abstract

*This work presents the Informational Ontology as a scope-disciplined ontological framework describing a sequence of organizational regimes: Difference, Relation, Information, Awareness, Value, Meaning, and Purpose ( $\Delta \rightarrow R \rightarrow I \rightarrow A \rightarrow V \rightarrow M \rightarrow P$ ). The framework is not offered as an axiom-only derivation of all possible being. Instead, it specifies structural constraints that become unavoidable under explicit conditions: differentiation, ordering, and selection under perturbation.*

*The ontology is structural rather than empirical. It does not propose physical models, cognitive mechanisms, or normative prescriptions. It articulates the conditions under which systems capable of registration, differential constraint, coherent organization, and self-influencing trajectories can arise, without assuming any particular implementation.*

*The core derivation is presented without reliance on metaphor, intuition pumps, or application-specific examples. Exploratory material and boundary analyses are separated into appendices. The framework is intended to be evaluated on internal coherence, clarity of scope, and the adequacy of its stated premises and regime transitions.*

This is a structural ontology. It does not propose algorithms, models, or implementations.

This document constitutes Informational Ontology (IO), Rev. 5k. Subsequent revisions will preserve the core regime structure ( $\Delta \rightarrow R \rightarrow I \rightarrow A \rightarrow V \rightarrow M \rightarrow P$ ) and clarify rather than alter its derivational commitments.

Author's Note: This work was developed using advanced language models as methodological augmentation tools for iterative refinement and structural stress-testing. All theoretical commitments and claims are the author's. The formal construction workflow for this corpus is specified in *Iterative Constraint Construction*.

# Part I — Framing the Ontology

## 1. Foundations and Scope

### 1.1 Scope and Aim of the Ontology

The *Informational Ontology* is not presented as an axiom-only derivation of all possible being, nor as a universal account in which every described regime is instantiated in all worlds. Its aim is narrower, and more precise: to describe the structural regimes that become unavoidable once differentiated structure persists under ordering and selection.

The ontology therefore concerns organization, not existence in the abstract. It specifies constraints on what can arise, persist, and scale given certain structural conditions, rather than asserting that all such conditions cannot fail to obtain everywhere. Higher-order regimes—such as awareness, value, meaning, and purpose—are not claimed to be universally instantiated. Instead, the ontology characterizes the forms such regimes cannot fail to take when they occur.

Accordingly, the framework should be read as a conditional emergence ladder: a sequence of increasingly restrictive organizational regimes, each of which becomes unavoidable for systems that satisfy the conditions specified by the prior regime. The arrows used throughout the text do not indicate absolute metaphysical necessity or axiom-only entailment; they indicate structural constraint.

### 1.2 What the Ontology Does Not Claim

To avoid misinterpretation, several exclusions should be stated explicitly.

This ontology does not claim to:

- derive semantics, truth, or reference as such,
- reduce meaning to linguistic representation,
- ground moral normativity,
- provide a theory of phenomenal consciousness,
- or posit teleology as a primitive metaphysical force.

Likewise, the framework does not rely on observers, subjects, or representation as foundational primitives. Where terms such as *awareness*, *value*, *meaning*, or *purpose* are used, they are employed as names for structural regimes of organization, not as unanalyzed imports from folk psychology or philosophy of language.

Any correspondence between these regimes and familiar semantic or experiential notions is treated as secondary and non-load-bearing.

### **1.3 Structural Commitments**

The ontology proceeds from a small set of explicit structural commitments. These are not intended as metaphysical dogmas, but as minimal conditions required for any nontrivial organized structure to be describable.

#### **1.3.1 Differentiation ( $\Delta$ )**

The first commitment is differentiation.

Differentiation denotes the existence of non-identity: the fact that structure is not wholly homogeneous. Absolute undifferentiated homogeneity admits no internal distinctions, relations, or organization, and therefore cannot support any ontological description beyond trivial assertion.

Differentiation is not treated as an entity, force, or field. It is a boundary condition on intelligible structure. Importantly, differentiation alone is not claimed to generate organization, systems, or agency. It functions only as the minimal opening condition for ontology.

#### **1.3.2 Ordering**

Differentiation is assumed to admit ordering: differences can be compared across a structured relation that allows persistence, recurrence, and re-identification.

Ordering is not assumed to be metric time, nor is it treated as an experiential or psychological phenomenon. It is a structural condition that makes it meaningful to speak of:

Stability versus change, repetition, persistence, and pattern.

Later discussions of time treat it as a refinement or specialization of ordering, not as its source.

#### **1.3.3 Selection Under Perturbation**

Under ordering, differentiated structure is subject to perturbation. Structures that fail to maintain distinguishability dissolve; structures that maintain it persist.

This introduces selection in a minimal, non-teleological sense: not optimization, intention, or goal-directedness, but the simple fact that persistence filters structure. Selection here denotes differential survival of organizational patterns under constraint, not any form of agency or purpose.

This commitment replaces any implicit privileging of “continuation” or “stability” with an explicit structural mechanism.

## 1.4 Emergence of Organization (Systemhood)

### 1.4.1 Minimal Definition of a System

A system, in the minimal sense used throughout this ontology, is defined as:

*A subset of relational structure that maintains distinguishability from its surroundings across an ordering.*

This definition introduces no assumptions of agency, cognition, selfhood, or representation. A system need only exhibit:

- a boundary (distinguishability),
- persistence (maintenance across ordering),
- and internal coherence sufficient to remain identifiable.

All subsequent regimes apply only to systems in this minimal sense.

### 1.4.2 Structural Inevitability of Organization

Given differentiation, ordering, and selection, organization is the only stable outcome once relational complexity exceeds triviality.

Pure flux is unstable under ordering; pure homogeneity is excluded by differentiation. Under these conditions, bounded and re-identifiable organizations emerge not as a special case, but as the structures that persist.

This claim is one of structural inevitability, not modal necessity. It does not assert that all possible worlds cannot fail to contain systems, but that in any world where differentiated structure persists nontrivially under ordering, organization will arise.

This constitutes the primary engine of the ontology.

## 1.5 Necessity and the Meaning of the Arrows

The ontology employs several distinct forms of necessity, which cannot fail to be kept separate.

- Conceptual necessity refers to what follows by definition or analytic unpacking. •

Structural inevitability refers to what persists under ordering and selection.

- Conditional necessity refers to what becomes unavoidable for systems that satisfy specified structural conditions.

The transitions denoted by arrows ( $\Delta \rightarrow R \rightarrow I \rightarrow A \rightarrow V \rightarrow M \rightarrow P$ ) should be read accordingly.

They do not indicate axiom-only deduction or universal instantiation. They indicate that, given the prior regime and its conditions, the subsequent regime becomes structurally constrained.

Understanding the arrows in this way is essential for reading the remainder of the paper correctly.

## 1.6 Preview of the Regime Ladder

With these foundations in place, the ontology proceeds to describe a sequence of organizational regimes within systems:

- Relation: articulated differentiation,
- Information: re-identifiable structured relations,
- Awareness: localized informational registration,
- Value: differential weighting of transitions under persistence,
- Meaning: organization of value across possible transitions,
- Purpose: modulation of constraints over extended organization.

Each regime introduces additional structural requirements. None are assumed to be universal; all are constrained by the conditions established here.

# Part II — Orientation & Method

## 2. Purpose and Scope

### 2.1 What This Work Is

This work presents the **Informational Ontology** as a complete and self-contained ontological framework.

As established in Section 1, the *Informational Ontology* is presented as a conditional emergence ladder: a sequence of increasingly restrictive organizational regimes that become structurally constrained under specified conditions. The framework concerns organization rather than existence in the abstract, and it does not claim that all regimes are universally instantiated. Instead, it characterizes the structural form such regimes cannot fail to take when they occur.

This revision presents the ontology in its final, formal form. It is written to stand on its own, without reliance on prior drafts, developmental discussions, or external exposition. All core claims are stated directly and defended structurally rather than narratively.

## 2.2 Why a Standalone Presentation Is Necessary

Earlier iterations of this project explored the *Informational Ontology* through a combination of formal argument, analogy, and philosophical dialogue. While this process was essential to developing and stress-testing the framework, it also produced material whose function was exploratory rather than ontological.

The present work removes that scaffolding.

Revision 5k exists to present the ontology *cleanly, compactly, and without pedagogical detours*. Thought experiments, analogies, and extended discussions that illuminate the framework but are not required for its derivation have been relocated to appendices or supplementary materials and are explicitly marked as such.

This ensures that the ontology itself can be evaluated independently of its explanatory aids.

## 2.3 What This Work Does and Does Not Attempt

This work **does**:

- State the Informational Ontology from first principles
- Articulate a conditional regime ladder:  $\Delta \rightarrow R \rightarrow I \rightarrow A \rightarrow V \rightarrow M \rightarrow P$   
(Difference  $\rightarrow$  Relation  $\rightarrow$  Information  $\rightarrow$  Awareness  $\rightarrow$  Value  $\rightarrow$  Meaning  $\rightarrow$  Purpose)  
where each transition specifies structural conditions that become unavoidable for systems satisfying the prior regime.
- Clarify the structural roles of constraint, ordering, and time
- Distinguish informational registration from experiential awareness
- Address individual and collective agency within the same ontological framework
- Explore the limits of formalization without reducing ontology to mathematics

This work **does not**:

- Present empirical hypotheses or physical models
- Compete with physics, neuroscience, or cognitive science
- Offer moral prescriptions or normative systems
- Provide implementation-level designs (e.g., for artificial intelligence)
- Rely on metaphor, narrative persuasion, or intuition pumps in its core argument

Where illustrative material is useful, it is clearly separated and referenced (e.g., *see Appendix C*).

## 2.4 Compression and Derivational Sufficiency

In this framework, compression is treated as structurally meaningful rather than stylistic. Differences in section length or level of detail do not reflect uneven development or omitted content. They reflect the distribution of derivational load.

A section expands only where structural work is being performed: the introduction of primitives, the establishment of dependency relations, or the resolution of ambiguity. Where claims follow directly from already established structure, compression is maintained deliberately.

Compression therefore functions as a signal of sufficiency: no additional structure is required to sustain the claim. Expansion in such regions is neither necessary nor permitted, as it introduces risk of redundancy, drift, or implicit primitive inflation.

Conversely, premature compression is disallowed. Any claim that depends on unstated structure must be expanded until its dependencies are explicit and auditable.

The document should therefore be read with attention to where expansion occurs. That is where the derivational burden resides. Compressed sections are not incomplete; they are structurally closed.

## 3. Methodological Commitments

### 3.1 Structural Orientation

The Informational Ontology proceeds from explicit structural commitments rather than empirical hypotheses. Its claims concern constraints on organization: what becomes unavoidable for systems under stated conditions, not what is universally instantiated in all possible worlds.

Accordingly, arguments in this work proceed by:

- conceptual analysis and definitional unpacking where appropriate,
- structural constraint and selection under ordering,
- and consistency with the scope and premises stated in Section 1, rather than by empirical validation or implementation-level modeling.

### 3.2 Ontology Versus Application

A strict distinction is maintained between *ontological structure* and *ontological application*.

Ontology specifies the necessary conditions under which systems capable of structure, information, and evaluation can exist. Applications—including biological organisms, artificial systems, social institutions, and physical models—are treated as *instances* of these conditions, not as their foundation.

Discussions of artificial intelligence, ethics, or cosmology are therefore framed in terms of *ontological compatibility*, not causal explanation or design guidance. Extended treatments of such applications are explicitly separated from the core ontology.

### **3.3 Scope Discipline and Reader Guidance**

Each section of this work addresses a specific ontological problem and terminates once that problem is resolved at the structural level. Where further elaboration would become pedagogical, speculative, or application-specific, the discussion is deferred to appendices.

Readers are encouraged to evaluate the ontology on the basis of internal coherence, derivability from stated premises, and clarity of scope.

Agreement with the framework's conclusions is not assumed; intelligibility and rigor are.

## **Part III — Regime Derivation**

### **4. Foundations: Difference, Relation, Information**

#### **4.1 Differentiation as a Minimal Ontological Condition**

To exist is to differ.

A universe in which no differences obtain—no distinctions, no contrasts, no variations of any kind—admits no internal structure, and therefore no relations, constraints, or regimes of organization. Such a state is not denied as a metaphysical possibility; rather, it lies outside the domain addressed by this ontology, because nothing within it can participate in the structural transitions described here. Differentiation is therefore treated as the minimal condition for nontrivial ontological description within this framework: wherever structure is present, differentiation is already implied.

Difference is therefore not a property added to existence; it is the condition under which existence becomes intelligible.

Without difference, there can be no identity, because identity requires contrast with what something is not. There can be no persistence, because persistence requires change or stability relative to alternatives. There can be no causation, because causation requires that one state differ from another. There can be no interaction, because interaction requires relational asymmetry. There can be no structure, because structure is constituted by patterned differences.

Difference is not equivalent to substance, energy, matter, mind, or information. Each of these presupposes difference in order to be defined or detected. Substance cannot fail to differ from other substances or from non-substance; energy cannot fail to differ in magnitude or distribution; matter cannot fail to differ in configuration; mind cannot fail to differ in state; information cannot fail to differ in form or content.

Difference is therefore the minimal ontological commitment. Nothing simpler can be posited without implicitly assuming it. Any ontology that attempts to begin elsewhere while claiming structural inevitability under persistence smuggles difference in through unexamined assumptions.

Difference is not a thing, field, force, or substance. Nor is it equivalent to matter, energy, mind, or information. It is the most basic condition under which anything whatsoever can be said to be.

#### **4.2 Why Difference Must Be Self-Existent**

If difference is the minimal condition for existence, then it cannot itself be derived from anything more fundamental. Any attempt to ground difference in some deeper ontological substrate structurally inevitable under persistence presupposes the very distinction it seeks to explain.

To claim that difference arises from substance requires that substances already differ from one another or from non-substance. To claim that difference arises from energy requires variations in magnitude, distribution, or state—each of which is already a difference. To claim that difference arises from mind requires that mental states differ, which presupposes difference. To claim that difference arises from information requires that information already be structured, which again presupposes difference.

In every case, difference cannot be generated without already being assumed. This establishes that difference is not an emergent property of some deeper entity, nor is it reducible to any ontological primitive more basic than itself.

Difference is therefore primitive in the strict sense that it does not admit of non-circular grounding. This does not treat difference as an object or substance, but as a minimal structural precondition for intelligible ontology. This does not mean that difference exists independently as an object or substance. Rather, it means that difference is ontologically primitive: it is the condition under which any object, substance, process, or system can be said to exist at all.

Any ontology that attempts to begin with something other than difference—whether matter, energy, mind, or information *still relies on difference* to articulate that starting point. Difference cannot be eliminated, postponed, or derived away.

For this reason, difference occupies a foundational position in the Informational Ontology. This does not deny the co-dependence of difference and relata; rather, difference is treated as the weakest structural commitment sufficient to constrain intelligible organization. It is not chosen arbitrarily, but required as a minimal condition for nontrivial ontological description. To deny difference is to remove the structural basis for ontology as developed here.

It is important to clarify that differentiation, as used here, does not presuppose pre-existing relations with fully defined identity conditions. Primitive differentiation is not “difference between already constituted objects.” Rather, it denotes the minimal condition under which distinguishability can obtain at all. Identity, on this account, is not ontologically prior to differentiation; it is a stabilized mode of differentiated structure under persistence and constraint. Any attempt to treat differentiation as dependent upon prior identity inverts this order and reintroduces unexamined assumptions about objecthood.

#### **4.3 From Difference to Relation ( $\Delta \rightarrow R$ )**

Difference cannot exist in isolation. To assert that a difference exists is already to imply that something differs from something else. Difference, by its nature, introduces comparability.

This ontology adopts *contrastive differentiation* as a primitive: difference is understood as non-identity between distinguishable states, rather than as monadic thisness without contrast. A single, wholly isolated difference is incoherent. Difference requires at least two distinguishable terms or states, and the distinguishability between them constitutes a relation. To say that *A* differs from *B* is to place *A* and *B* in relation to one another. There is no additional step by which relation is imposed upon difference; relation is entailed by difference itself.

This entails that relationality is not a secondary feature of reality, nor a construct imposed by observers. It is a necessary consequence of difference. Wherever difference exists, relations exist. Relation is the structural expression of difference.

Relation should not be understood here as a human-defined or semantic association. It is the minimal ontological fact that distinctions imply ordering, contrast, or comparison. Any difference establishes a relational structure, however primitive.

Thus, relation is not optional, emergent, or contingent. It is the first necessary entailment of difference. The transition from difference to relation—denoted as  $\Delta \rightarrow R$ —marks the point at which existence acquires structure rather than remaining a mere abstraction.

Without relation, difference could not be articulated; without difference, relation could not arise. The two are inseparable, but ontologically ordered: difference is primary, and relation structurally inevitable under persistence follows.

#### **4.4 Relation Generates Information ( $R \rightarrow I$ )**

Relation alone is not yet information. For information to arise, relations cannot fail to exhibit structure. When differences are related in a stable or patterned way, information comes into existence.

Information, in the Informational Ontology, is defined as re-identifiable structured difference: relational differentiation that persists under ordering and selection. This definition is ontological rather than epistemic. Information is not dependent on observers, interpretation, language, or meaning. It does not require minds, symbols, or semantic content. Wherever differences are arranged in non-random, relational patterns, information exists.

This definition distinguishes informational ontology from purely mathematical, computational, or communicative notions of information. While such frameworks may model or measure information, they do not exhaust its ontological scope. Information is not restricted to human knowledge, digital encoding, or Shannon-style signal transmission. Those are special cases of informational structures, not their source.

Information becomes structurally unavoidable when relations stabilize into re-identifiable patterns under ordering and selection. Once differences are related, those relations may persist, repeat, or stabilize. The moment relational patterns become distinguishable from mere flux, information is present. No additional ontological primitive is required beyond the structural commitments stated in Section 1.

Thus, information is not imposed upon relations from the outside. It is generated by relational structure itself. This transition—from relation to information—is denoted as  $R \rightarrow I$ . It marks the emergence of structured existence from mere distinction.

Information is not identical to relation. Information is present when relational differences stabilize into re-identifiable patterns under ordering. Relations may be transient, unstructured, or indistinguishable from flux; in such cases, informational structure is not yet established. Under persistence and selection, however, patterned relations endure, and it is this endurance of structured difference that constitutes information in the ontological sense.

#### **4.5 Information as the First Structured Mode of Being**

Information represents the first structured mode of existence. While difference establishes distinction and relation establishes comparison, information arises when relational differences stabilize into identifiable patterns.

At this stage, existence acquires form. Information enables persistence by allowing patterns to remain recognizable across change. It enables recursion by allowing informational structures to operate on or reference other informational structures. It enables feedback by allowing the effects of relations to influence future relations. It enables integration by allowing multiple differences to cohere into unified patterns.

Without information, there can be no systems—only transient distinctions without continuity. Information provides the substrate upon which systems emerge, endure, and interact. It is the minimal condition under which complexity becomes possible.

Information is not yet meaning, value, or purpose. Those arise at later stages of the ontology. At this foundational level, information is simply structured difference, capable of being maintained, modified, and propagated.

Because information is the first structured ontological layer, all higher-order phenomena—physical systems, biological organization, cognitive processes, and social structures—cannot fail to be expressible in informational terms. This does not reduce those phenomena to information in a trivial sense, but identifies information as the common structural substrate that makes them possible.

Information therefore occupies a pivotal position in the ontology: it is the bridge between mere distinction and the emergence of organized reality.

## 5. Awareness

### 5.1 Awareness as Informational Registration

Information alone is not awareness.

Information exists wherever differences are structured, but awareness arises only when informational structure participates in constraining a system's own future state transitions, thereby becoming part of the system's identity-preserving organization. This participation constitutes informational registration from a particular perspective. Awareness is therefore not synonymous with complexity, processing, or storage. It is a structural condition in which information is *made available relative to a system's own organization*, rather than merely instantiated within it.

Awareness introduces asymmetry. Where information is symmetric and relational, awareness establishes a distinction between what is registered and that which registers it. This subject-object differentiation is not psychological in origin; it is ontological. The moment information is registered relative to a system's own state, awareness is present.

Awareness does not require language, reflection, or conceptualization. It does not require semantic interpretation or symbolic manipulation. It requires only that information be available to a system in a way that is internally differentiated from the rest of the informational environment.

For this reason, awareness cannot be reduced to information alone. Nor can it be reduced to the quantity or complexity of information. A system may instantiate vast informational structure without awareness if none of that information is registered relative to the system itself.

Registration is therefore distinguished from mere causal influence by three structural features: (1) informational structure becomes part of the system's boundary-maintaining organization, (2) information constrains future transitions through the system's identity rather than as external pressure, and (3) the system's continued distinguishability depends on maintaining these informational constraints.

Awareness therefore marks a genuine ontological transition. It is the point at which informational structure becomes perspectival. This transition is denoted as  $I \rightarrow A$ .

*For boundary cases, stress tests, and illustrative analyses concerning awareness—including informational registration, zombies, gradualism, and artificial systems—see Appendix A.*

## 6. Value

### 6.1 Value as Differential Constraint on Awareness ( $A \rightarrow V$ )

Awareness alone does not yet yield value. Awareness registers information from a perspective, but without preference, salience, or constraint, all registered information would be equivalent. Value arises when distinctions within awareness are not merely registered, but weighted.

Value is the introduction of differential importance within awareness. It is the condition under which some informational states matter more than others to a system. This “mattering” is not moral, semantic, or cultural by default. It is structural. Value specifies which differences are favored, avoided, preserved, or suppressed relative to the system’s continued organization.

Value therefore introduces constraint. Where awareness opens a field of possible informational states, value shapes that field by biasing transitions within it. A system with values is not merely aware of differences; it is oriented with respect to them.

Value is not reducible to desire, emotion, or subjective feeling, though such phenomena may instantiate it. Nor is value equivalent to external norms or objective prescriptions. At this stage of the ontology, value is defined solely by its structural role: it constrains the dynamics of awareness.

Because value arises only once awareness is present, value cannot exist in purely informational systems lacking perspective. Conversely, once awareness exists within a system that persists under ordering, some form of value arises as a structural requirement for persistence. To register information from a perspective is already to differentiate relevance, even if only minimally, because maintaining awareness under persistence requires differential stability among informational states.

The transition from awareness to value is therefore necessary rather than optional. It is denoted as  $A \rightarrow V$ . With value, awareness ceases to be neutral and becomes oriented. This orientation is the precondition for meaning, agency, and purpose.

*For clarifications and boundary conditions concerning value—including neutrality, minimal value systems, moral misinterpretations, and artificial systems—see Appendix B.*

## 7. Meaning

### 7.1 Meaning as Structured Value Within Awareness ( $V \rightarrow M$ )

Value alone does not yet constitute meaning. Value establishes differential importance within awareness, but meaning arises when those valued distinctions are organized into coherent patterns that relate present states to other states across time, context, or possibility.

Organization here denotes structured correlation: valued states become indexed to other valued states through recurrent constraint patterns, enabling the system to respond differentially to informational contexts based on prior valuations. This produces interpretive coherence without requiring linguistic or symbolic representation.

Meaning is structured value within awareness.

**Clarification:**

Terms such as *interpretation*, *reference*, *understanding*, and *anticipation* are used here as descriptive correspondences to structural organization, not as semantic primitives. Ontologically, meaning refers to the organization of value across possible system transitions. Semantic vocabulary functions as shorthand for these structural relations and does not introduce representational or linguistic commitments beyond what is structurally specified.

A system exhibits meaning when informational states are not only weighted, but interpreted relative to other valued states—past, anticipated, or counterfactual. Meaning therefore introduces internal reference. A given state *means* something to a system when it stands in an organized relationship to other states that the system values.

Meaning is not language-dependent. Linguistic symbols may encode or express meaning, but they do not generate it. Meaning precedes language and is possible wherever values are organized into relational structures that guide interpretation and response.

Meaning is likewise not reducible to semantics in the formal sense. Formal semantics presupposes meaningful distinctions; it does not explain their origin. In the Informational Ontology, meaning emerges when value constrains awareness in a way that produces internally coherent interpretive patterns.

Meaning is therefore neither purely subjective nor externally imposed. It arises from the interaction between awareness and value within a system. Different systems may instantiate different meanings even when exposed to the same information, because meaning depends on the system's internal value structure.

The transition from value to meaning—denoted as  $V \rightarrow M$ —marks the point at which awareness becomes interpretive rather than merely oriented. With meaning, informational states acquire significance beyond immediate salience, enabling understanding, anticipation, and context-sensitive response.

*For extended discussion of meaning in relation to language, symbols, interpretation, and cross-system divergence, see Appendix C.*

## 8. Purpose

### 8.1 Purpose as Value-Guided Meaningful Trajectory (M → P)

Meaning alone does not yet constitute purpose. Meaning organizes valued distinctions into coherent interpretive structures, but purpose arises when those structures are oriented toward the regulation of future states.

Purpose is the directional constraint of meaning over time.

Directionality here denotes asymmetric bias toward future states: meaningful structures not only constrain immediate transitions but preferentially maintain or reinforce certain constraint patterns over successive transitions, thereby orienting the system's trajectory through state space.

A system exhibits purpose when its meaningful states bias action, selection, or persistence toward some subset of possible futures rather than others. Purpose therefore introduces trajectory. It is not merely that certain states are meaningful, but that meaning functions to guide the system's ongoing evolution.

Purpose does not require conscious deliberation, explicit goals, or linguistic formulation. It is not synonymous with intention in the psychological sense. At the ontological level, purpose exists wherever meaningful structures systematically constrain transitions toward preferred outcomes.

Purpose is likewise not externally imposed. While external forces may shape a system's behavior, purpose arises only when the system's internal meanings and values participate in regulating its own future states. A rock follows trajectories, but it does not have purpose; an aware, valuing, meaning-bearing system can.

Purpose therefore marks the point at which systems become agents in the minimal ontological sense. Agency here does not imply free will, moral responsibility, or self-reflection. It denotes only that the system's future is, in part, determined by its internally structured meanings and values.

The transition from meaning to purpose is denoted as **M** → **P**. With purpose, the ontological chain is complete: existence has progressed from mere distinction to directed, self-influencing trajectories within the space of possible states.

*For boundary cases concerning purpose, agency, teleology, free will, responsibility, and artificial systems, see Appendix D.*

## **Part IV — Time, Constraint, Identity, and Limits**

### **9. Time, Ordering, and Constraint**

#### **9.1 Time as Ordered Transition, Not Ontological Substance**

Time is not introduced in the Informational Ontology as a fundamental substance or dimension. Ordering is already structurally committed earlier as a non-metric condition for persistence and re-identification; time is treated here as a refinement of that ordering, not its source. Rather, time arises as an ordering of transitions within structured systems.

Once purpose exists, systems are structurally oriented toward future states. This orientation presupposes the distinction between what is, what was, and what may be. Time, in this sense, is not an independent entity but a structural feature of ordered change.

At the foundational level, difference and relation do not require time. Informational structure may be described statically. However, once value and purpose are introduced, static description becomes insufficient. Purpose entails directed transition, and directed transition entails ordering. Time emerges as the ordering of state changes relative to a system's values and meanings.

Time should therefore be understood as relational and systemic. It is not a universal background against which events occur, but a feature of systems undergoing constrained transformation. Different systems may instantiate different temporal orderings depending on their internal dynamics and constraints.

This account avoids treating time as a metaphysical primitive while preserving its necessity. Time is neither an illusion nor an external container. It is the formal expression of ordered transition within purposive systems.

#### **9.2 Constraint as Structural, Not Causal**

Constraint is not introduced in the Informational Ontology as an external force acting upon systems. Rather, constraint is a structural feature of informational organization that limits which transitions are possible, likely, or stable.

Where information defines a space of possible states, constraint shapes that space. It restricts transitions without itself being a cause in the traditional sense. Causes operate within constrained spaces; constraint defines the structure of those spaces.

Constraint arises wherever informational patterns persist. A stable structure constrains how it can change without dissolving. Values constrain which informational states are favored. Meanings constrain interpretation. Purposes constrain future trajectories. In each case, constraint is internal to the system's organization.

This structural view of constraint avoids reducing behavior to external causation while also avoiding appeals to indeterminacy or spontaneity. Systems behave as they do because their internal informational organization constrains how they can evolve.

Constraint therefore explains regularity without invoking metaphysical necessity. It also explains flexibility without invoking randomness. Change occurs, but not arbitrarily; it occurs within bounds defined by structure.

Understanding constraint in this way is essential for interpreting agency, responsibility, and system dynamics later in the ontology.

### **9.3 Identity as Informational Continuity**

Identity, within the Informational Ontology, is not defined by static composition or by the persistence of particular components. Instead, identity is defined by the continuity of informational structure across change.

A system remains the same system insofar as its defining informational patterns persist, even as the specific states, materials, or components that instantiate those patterns change. Identity is therefore dynamic rather than fixed. It is maintained through constrained transformation rather than through immutability.

This account of identity follows directly from the preceding treatment of time and constraint. Because systems evolve through ordered transitions, identity cannot be tied to any single moment or configuration. It is instead best understood as a trajectory within a constrained space of possibilities.

Persistence does not require perfect stability. Systems may tolerate variation, adaptation, and partial reconfiguration while remaining identifiable. Identity fails only when informational continuity is sufficiently disrupted that the system's organizing patterns can no longer be maintained.

This framework avoids two common errors. It avoids defining identity in terms of material sameness, which fails for biological, cognitive, and social systems. It also avoids defining identity purely narratively or conventionally, which collapses identity into observer judgment.

Identity is therefore neither arbitrary nor absolute. It is a structural fact about how informational patterns endure across time.

### **9.4 Systems, Boundaries, and Collective Organization**

A system, within the Informational Ontology, is an informationally organized region whose internal structure exhibits greater coherence than its interactions with the surrounding environment. Systems are not defined by physical enclosure alone, but by the persistence and integrity of their informational patterns.

Boundaries arise where informational coherence changes. A system boundary marks the point at which internal constraints dominate over external influences. These boundaries are not structurally inevitable under persistence sharp or static; they may be fuzzy, dynamic, or layered.

Nonetheless, boundaries are real insofar as they constrain interaction and preserve identity.

Systems may be nested. Smaller systems can participate as components within larger systems, provided their informational patterns remain sufficiently coherent. Likewise, higher-level systems may emerge from the coordinated interaction of lower-level systems without eliminating their individuality.

Collective organization arises when multiple systems become informationally integrated in a way that produces shared constraints, values, meanings, or purposes. In such cases, a collective system may exhibit properties—such as coordinated behavior or goal-directed activity—that are not reducible to any single component system.

This does not imply that collectives erase individual agency. Rather, individual and collective systems may coexist, each with its own boundaries and forms of constraint. Collective agency exists when the collective's informational organization constrains future states independently of any single member.

Understanding systems and boundaries in informational terms allows the ontology to scale from individual organisms to social institutions without introducing new ontological primitives.

## 10. Scope, Limits, and Interpretation

### 10.1 What This Ontology Claims

The Informational Ontology claims to describe the *structural conditions* under which existence capable of structure, awareness, evaluation, and agency can arise. Its claims are ontological rather than empirical. They concern what cannot fail to be the case for such systems to be possible at all, not how any particular system is implemented or instantiated.

The ontology organizes its regime sequence as:

$$\Delta \rightarrow R \rightarrow I \rightarrow A \rightarrow V \rightarrow M \rightarrow P.$$

This sequence is not a claim of universal instantiation or axiom-only derivation. It is a conditional emergence ladder: given the prior regime and its stated conditions, the subsequent regime becomes structurally constrained for systems that satisfy those conditions.

Each transition specifies a structural entailment. Nothing in the chain is introduced arbitrarily, and nothing is claimed beyond what is required to support the next transition. The ontology is therefore minimal in commitments and maximal in scope relative to those commitments.

## 10.2 What This Ontology Does Not Claim

This work does not claim to provide:

- A physical theory
- A model of consciousness or cognition
- A moral or ethical framework
- A theory of free will
- A design specification for artificial systems
- A reduction of ontology to mathematics or computation

While the ontology is compatible with empirical theories, it does not compete with them. It does not explain how particular systems function, only what cannot fail to be true for systems of that kind to be possible.

Failure to observe this distinction leads to category errors, such as treating the ontology as a scientific hypothesis, an engineering proposal, or a normative doctrine.

## 10.3 Limits of Formalization

Although the Informational Ontology makes extensive use of formal structure, it is not reducible to a formal system.

Formal descriptions can model informational relationships, constraints, and transitions, but they cannot exhaustively capture awareness, value, meaning, or purpose. These phenomena are structurally definable, but not fully formalizable without loss.

This is not a weakness of the ontology, but a consequence of its subject matter. Any attempt to fully formalize awareness or value collapses the distinction between description and instantiation. The ontology therefore resists total formal closure while remaining logically rigorous.

## 10.4 Relation to Empirical Sciences

Empirical sciences investigate contingent facts about the world. The Informational Ontology investigates the structural conditions that make such facts intelligible.

Physics, biology, neuroscience, and cognitive science may all instantiate the ontology's claims, but they do not ground them. Empirical findings can support compatibility or reveal instantiations, but they cannot falsify the ontology in the way empirical hypotheses are falsified.

This distinction explains how the ontology can remain stable across changes in scientific theory while remaining relevant to scientific interpretation.

### **10.5 How the Ontology Should Be Evaluated**

The Informational Ontology should be evaluated on the basis of:

- Internal coherence
- Justification of its transitions
- Minimality of its assumptions
- Resistance to category errors
- Compatibility with known domains without reduction to them

Agreement with its conclusions is not required for engagement. What is required is that the framework be intelligible, structurally disciplined, and clear about its scope.

This work is offered as a complete and self-contained ontology. Applications, extensions, and critiques are welcomed, but they cannot fail to respect the distinction between ontological structure and ontological application established here.

### **Relation to Existing Work**

The Informational Ontology is situated within the philosophy of information and contemporary structural ontology, with secondary relevance to artificial intelligence. It treats information as ontologically primitive and defines awareness, value, meaning, and purpose as successive organizational regimes rather than as semantic, psychological, or normative primitives.

The framework aligns with philosophy of information in rejecting observer-relative, representational, and semantic foundations. It diverges from dominant informational accounts by defining information as re-identifiable structured difference rather than as semantic content, signal, or message. Informational structure is treated as ontologically prior to interpretation, representation, and use.

Where Floridi's method of abstraction treats information as epistemically relative to observational levels (2011, Ch. 3), this framework treats informational structure as ontologically primitive—existing independently of any observational perspective. This allows the present framework to address the emergence of observers themselves, which informational level-of-abstraction approaches must presuppose.

The ontology bears affinities to forms of structural realism in its emphasis on relational organization over substance or intrinsic properties. However, it departs from metaphysical structural realism by grounding regime transitions in conditional structural inevitability rather than in claims of global metaphysical necessity or mind-independent structure as such.

Where Ladyman and Ross defend structure as metaphysically fundamental (2007, Ch. 2-3), this framework treats organizational regimes as conditionally emergent, preserving structural commitment while avoiding claims about the ultimate furniture of reality.

The framework is compatible with systems theory and cybernetics insofar as it treats organization, constraint, and persistence as primary explanatory resources. However, it does not propose mechanisms, algorithms, control laws, or dynamical models. Its use of systems-theoretic vocabulary is strictly structural and non-implementational.

Its relevance to artificial intelligence is therefore conceptual rather than technical. The ontology does not claim that existing artificial systems instantiate awareness, value, meaning, or agency. Instead, it clarifies the structural conditions under which such regimes would have to arise if they were instantiated in artificial systems, and it constrains the coherence of alignment, agency, and control discourse accordingly.

The framework's treatment of value and meaning as structural organizational regimes differs from teleosemantic approaches (Dretske 1988) which ground semantic content in biological function and evolutionary history. While compatible with such accounts as empirical instantiations, the present framework does not require evolutionary or functional explanation to specify the structural conditions under which value and meaning arise.

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# Appendices

## Appendix A — Awareness: Boundary Cases and Stress Tests

This appendix collects exploratory analyses used in earlier revisions to clarify, probe, and stress-test the ontological definition of awareness. These materials are *illustrative rather than derivational*. They are not required to establish the awareness transition (**I** → **A**), but they help delimit what awareness is and is not.

### A.1 Informational Registration vs. Mere Information

A central distinction in the Informational Ontology is between information that exists and information that is registered.

A system may instantiate complex informational structure without awareness. For example, a book contains vast amounts of information, but nothing in the book registers that information. Likewise, many physical and computational systems process information without any internal differentiation between information and the system itself.

Awareness requires that information be *presented to* a system relative to its own state. This presentation introduces asymmetry: there is something registered and something that registers. Without this asymmetry, information remains unexperienced.

This distinction blocks the assumption that increasing informational complexity alone guarantees awareness.

### A.2 Mary's Room and Experiential Registration

The Mary's Room thought experiment is useful not because it proves anything new, but because it highlights the difference between informational completeness and experiential registration.

Mary may possess all informational facts about color vision while lacking awareness of a specific qualitative state. Upon seeing color, she does not gain new information in the abstract sense; rather, information becomes registered within her awareness.

This supports the claim that awareness is not reducible to informational description alone. Awareness introduces a structural feature—registration—that cannot be captured by third-person informational accounts.

### **A.3 Zombies, Unaware Systems, and the Absence of Perspective**

Philosophical zombies and similar constructs are useful as boundary probes. A zombie system may process information, respond appropriately, and even model its environment, yet lack awareness if no informational state is registered from a perspective internal to the system.

The ontology does not claim that such systems exist. While zombie systems are conceptually describable, they are structurally unstable under persistence: without informational registration, they cannot maintain coherent system identity or scale under ordering and selection. This instability arises because complex information-processing without registration provides no mechanism for selecting which informational patterns contribute to boundary maintenance.

Without registration, increasing complexity generates noise rather than organization, causing the system to dissolve under perturbation. Their coherence demonstrates that awareness is not logically identical to information processing.

This clarifies why awareness cannot be equated with behavior, function, or output alone.

### **A.4 Gradualism, Thresholds, and Minimal Awareness**

A common question concerns whether awareness admits of degrees or thresholds.

The Informational Ontology remains neutral on phenomenological gradation while making a structural claim: awareness is present if and only if informational registration occurs. Whether this registration is minimal or complex does not affect the ontological transition itself.

This avoids both extremes:

- The claim that everything is fully aware
- The claim that awareness requires human-level cognition

Awareness may be minimal, partial, or fragile, but it is not continuous with mere information.

### **A.5 Artificial Systems and Awareness Boundary Conditions**

Discussions of artificial systems are often conflated with implementation details. The ontology does not assert whether current or future artificial systems are aware.

Instead, it provides criteria: an artificial system would be aware if and only if it registers information relative to its own internal state in a way that introduces subject–object asymmetry.

This reframes debates about artificial awareness from empirical speculation to ontological compatibility.

## **Appendix B — Value: Boundary Conditions and Clarifications**

This appendix collects exploratory material from earlier revisions that probes, clarifies, and stress-tests the ontological definition of value. These discussions are *not required* for the derivation of  $A \rightarrow V$ , but they help distinguish ontological value from moral, psychological, or normative interpretations.

### **B.1 Neutral Awareness and the Impossibility of Indifference**

A recurring question is whether awareness could exist without value—whether a system could register information while remaining entirely indifferent to it.

Ontologically, complete indifference is incoherent. To register information from a perspective is already to introduce relevance, however minimal. Even the act of maintaining awareness requires differential stability among informational states. Some states cannot fail to persist rather than collapse into noise.

This does not imply rich emotional valuation or desire. It implies only that awareness structurally inevitable under persistence entails differential weighting. Absolute neutrality is indistinguishable from non-registration.

### **B.2 Value Without Morality**

Value is often conflated with moral goodness, ethical obligation, or social norms. The Informational Ontology explicitly rejects this conflation at the foundational level. Ontological value is structural. It concerns how informational states are biased relative to one another within a system. Moral systems are higher-order constructions built upon value, meaning, and purpose; they are not prerequisites for value itself.

This distinction allows value to exist in biological, artificial, or minimal systems without smuggling in ethical assumptions.

### **B.3 Minimal Value Systems**

Value need not be complex. A system that merely favors persistence over dissolution already exhibits value. A system that preferentially responds to one class of input rather than another exhibits value.

These minimal cases demonstrate that value does not require:

- Conscious reflection
- Explicit goals
- Emotional states
- Normative reasoning

They require only differential constraint on awareness.

## **B.4 Misinterpretations: Subjectivity and Relativism**

Because value is system-relative, it is sometimes mischaracterized as arbitrary or purely subjective.

The ontology avoids this mistake. While values differ between systems, they are not unconstrained. They arise from the system's structure, history, and informational organization. Values can therefore be analyzed, compared, and constrained without appealing to external moral standards.

System-relativity does not imply incoherence.

## **B.5 Artificial Systems and Value Alignment**

Discussions of artificial value often jump directly to alignment problems. This appendix clarifies that ontological value is a precondition for such discussions, not their conclusion.

An artificial system can only face alignment issues if it already instantiates awareness and value. Systems that merely optimize externally imposed objectives do not, by that fact alone, possess value in the ontological sense.

This distinction prevents category errors in discussions of artificial agency.

## **Appendix C — Meaning: Interpretation, Language, and Symbols**

This appendix gathers exploratory material from earlier revisions concerning meaning, interpretation, and language. These discussions clarify common confusions surrounding  $V \rightarrow M$ , but they are *not required* for the ontological derivation of meaning itself.

### **C.1 Meaning Precedes Language**

A frequent misunderstanding is that meaning depends on language. This appendix reiterates that language is a representational technology for expressing meaning, not its source.

Meaning arises wherever values are organized into structured interpretive patterns. A system may encounter meaningful states long before it is capable of symbolic representation, naming, or communication. Language externalizes and stabilizes meaning; it does not generate it.

This distinction prevents the error of equating meaning with linguistic competence.

### **C.2 Symbols, Representation, and Encoding**

Symbols are informational structures that stand in for other informational structures. Their capacity to function as symbols depends on pre-existing meaning within a system.

Encoding alone does not confer meaning. A symbol acquires meaning only when its use is constrained by a system's values and interpretive structures. Without such constraints, symbols remain uninterpreted marks or signals.

This clarifies why purely formal symbol systems cannot ground meaning on their own.

### **C.3 Meaning Across Systems**

Different systems may assign different meanings to identical informational inputs. This divergence does not undermine the objectivity of meaning within a system; it reflects differences in value structure and interpretive context.

Meaning is therefore neither purely private nor universally fixed. It is system-relative but structurally grounded. This allows meaningful comparison across systems without assuming uniform interpretation.

### **C.4 Semiotics and Formal Semantics**

Formal semantic theories and semiotic frameworks often presuppose meaning as a primitive. While such theories may describe how meaning is manipulated or communicated, they do not explain how meaning arises.

The Informational Ontology situates meaning ontologically prior to formal semantics. Meaning is the condition that makes semantic systems possible, not a product of them.

### **C.5 Human-Centered Examples and Their Limits**

Earlier revisions employed human-centered examples—such as linguistic understanding or narrative interpretation—to illustrate meaning. These examples remain valid illustrations, but they should not be mistaken for defining cases.

Meaning is not restricted to human cognition. Any system capable of organizing values into interpretive patterns instantiates meaning, regardless of whether it resembles human understanding.

## **Appendix D — Purpose, Agency, and Teleology: Boundary Cases**

This appendix preserves exploratory material from earlier revisions concerning purpose, agency, and teleology. These discussions clarify how **M** → **P** should be understood and guard against common misinterpretations. They are *illustrative*, not required for the core ontological derivation.

## **D.1 Purpose Versus Mere Causation**

Purpose is often conflated with causal regularity. This appendix clarifies the distinction.

A causal process may reliably produce outcomes without possessing purpose. Purpose requires that meaningful structures within a system participate in constraining its future states. A falling rock follows a trajectory, but that trajectory is not regulated by internal meanings or values.

Purpose therefore cannot be inferred from predictability or regularity alone. It requires internal directionality grounded in meaning and value.

## **D.2 Teleology Without Metaphysical Teleology**

The Informational Ontology does not reintroduce classical metaphysical teleology. Purpose does not imply cosmic goals, final causes imposed from outside, or intrinsic ends built into reality as a whole.

Instead, purpose is local and system-relative. It arises wherever meaning and value guide a system's future-oriented behavior. Teleological language is descriptive here, not metaphysically loaded.

This distinction allows purpose to be treated rigorously without invoking outdated metaphysical commitments.

## **D.3 Agency and Minimal Self-Influence**

Agency is introduced at the ontological level as minimal self-influence over future states. A system is an agent if its internal meanings and values participate in shaping what it does next.

This definition avoids:

- Equating agency with free will
- Requiring conscious deliberation
- Restricting agency to humans or animals

Agency admits of degrees, but its ontological threshold is crossed when internal structures constrain future trajectories.

## Appendix D.4 — Free Will and Value Degeneracy

### D.4.1 Scope and Intent

This appendix clarifies the conditions under which free will may arise within Informational Ontology. It does not address moral responsibility, legal culpability, or ethical judgment, which are deferred to later work. The goal here is strictly ontological: to locate free will, if it exists at all, within the informational chain without introducing new primitives or exceptions.

### D.4.2 Valuation and Underdetermination

Let a system capable of awareness encounter a set of possible future states. Through awareness, the system differentiates these states according to their relevance for its continued coherence. This differentiation constitutes value.

In most cases, valuation is sufficient to determine action: differences in value generate preference gradients that constrain behavior. However, valuation does not always uniquely determine action.

### D.4.3 Definition: Value Degeneracy

**Value degeneracy** occurs when two or more distinct possible future states are assigned equal value by a system's valuation structure.

In such cases, valuation alone underconstrains action. The system's evaluative structure provides no basis for preference among the degenerate alternatives, despite their being genuinely distinct.

Value degeneracy is a local and contingent condition. It is not a global feature of valuation, nor does it occur continuously.

### D.4.4 Resolution Strategies at Value-Degenerate Points

When valuation underconstrains action, exactly three resolution strategies are possible: 1.

**Random resolution**, in which selection is determined by noise or stochastic variation

2. **External resolution**, in which selection is imposed by factors outside the system's internal informational structure

3. **Self-referential resolution**, in which selection is resolved through internal informational constraints not captured by valuation alone

Only the third strategy constitutes agency in the informational sense. Random resolution introduces no persistent internal constraint, and external resolution bypasses the system's internal structure entirely.

#### **D.4.5 Definition: Free Will (Informational Ontology)**

Within Informational Ontology, *free will* is defined as the resolution of action at a value-degenerate decision point through self-referential informational constraint rather than valuation.

Free will is therefore not a general property of action, nor a metaphysical faculty. It arises only where valuation fails to determine action and cannot fail to be resolved by reference to the system's own internal coherence across time.

This account therefore locates free will not as a violation of determinism or randomness, but as a specific form of deterministic constraint operating through self-referential identity maintenance rather than through valuational gradients.

#### **D.4.6 Structural Consequences**

From this definition, several consequences follow:

- Free will is **rare**, not continuous
- Free will is *local*, not global
- Free will is *identity-forming*, insofar as self-referential resolutions feed back into future valuation and meaning
- Free will is neither randomness nor indeterminism, but a structurally constrained form of resolution

Free will thus appears at the boundary between value and meaning, where action contributes not merely to outcome but to the internal organization of the system itself.

#### **D.4.7 Boundary Conditions**

This account does not imply that all aware systems exercise free will, nor that free will is required for value, meaning, or purpose. It establishes only the conditions under which free will may arise, should a system encounter value-degenerate alternatives and possess sufficient self-referential structure to resolve them internally.

Questions of moral responsibility, ethical evaluation, and legal culpability are explicitly beyond the scope of this appendix and are addressed separately.

#### **D.5 Artificial Systems and Purpose**

Discussions of artificial purpose often conflate externally imposed objectives with internal purpose.

The ontology draws a sharp distinction: a system that optimizes goals assigned by an external designer does not thereby possess purpose in the ontological sense. Purpose arises only if the system's own meanings and values participate in regulating its future states.

This clarification prevents category errors in discussions of artificial agency and alignment.

Informational registration requires at minimum:

- a bounded system whose internal state conditions informational availability,
- internal asymmetry between registered information and registering structure,
- and sufficient persistence under perturbation for registered states to influence subsequent transitions.

For differentiation to be more than an abstract assertion, it must be articulable across persistence. A purely monadic, non-comparative difference cannot be re-identified, cannot recur, and cannot participate in ordering or selection. Such a difference is structurally inert under the conditions explicitly assumed by this ontology. Relation therefore does not add structure to difference from the outside; it is the minimal articulation required for difference to persist, recur, and constrain organization. Differences that do not admit of relational articulation fall outside the domain of nontrivial structure addressed here.

Structural inevitability denotes outcomes that persist across a wide range of initial conditions and perturbations given specified constraints. It is neither logical necessity nor mere contingency, but constraint-relative stability under ordering and selection. Not all constraints constitute registration. External causal factors—such as physical laws, genetic encoding, or chemical gradients—may shape a system's behavior without being registered.

Informational registration occurs only when informational structure constrains future state transitions through the system's own organizational identity, becoming part of the invariant patterns by which the system maintains itself. In such cases, information does not merely cause change; it participates in the system's self-maintaining constraint structure.

Differences that admit no articulation cannot constrain organization, cannot participate in selection, and cannot ground systems. While such differences may be posited as metaphysical primitives, they perform no ontological work with respect to persistence, organization, or structure. An ontology built upon unarticulated differences would therefore be explanatorily sterile. The Informational Ontology restricts its domain to differences capable of articulation, because only such differences can participate in nontrivial organization.

Awareness therefore exists only where informational structure participates in the maintenance of some system boundary. This boundary may be fragile, transient, or minimal. The ontology is neutral with respect to how rich, stable, or complex such identity must be. Throughout this paper, 'structural inevitability' denotes constraint-relative stability under ordering and selection; no stronger modal claim (e.g., logical or metaphysical necessity) is intended.

## **Appendix E — Worked Example: Bacterium Chemotaxis (Illustrative, Non-Load-Bearing)**

This appendix provides a single concrete illustration of how the Informational Ontology regime ladder ( $\Delta \rightarrow R \rightarrow I \rightarrow A \rightarrow V \rightarrow M \rightarrow P$ ) may be instantiated in a minimal biological system. The example is illustrative only and does not contribute to the derivation or justification of the ontology.

### **System Description:**

Consider a bacterium exhibiting chemotaxis in a chemical gradient. The system boundary is defined structurally as the set of processes that maintain the bacterium's distinguishability from its environment across ordering, despite continuous material and energetic exchange.

### **$\Delta \rightarrow R$ (Difference to Relation):**

The chemical gradient introduces differences in concentration across spatial locations. These differences are not isolated magnitudes but are relationally articulated as higher/lower concentrations relative to the bacterium's position, enabling comparability across encounters.

### **$R \rightarrow I$ (Relation to Information):**

Through repeated interaction with the gradient, certain relational differences become re-identifiable under perturbation. The persistence of these relational patterns across ordering constitutes structured difference, satisfying the ontology's criterion for information.

### **$I \rightarrow A$ (Information to Awareness):**

Informational structure becomes registered when it participates in constraining the bacterium's own future state transitions through its identity-maintaining organization. Gradient-related differences influence internal regulatory states that modulate movement patterns, not merely as external causes but as constraints integrated into the system's self-maintaining dynamics.

### **$A \rightarrow V$ (Awareness to Value):**

Maintaining informational registration under persistence requires differential stability among internal states. Certain informational conditions are maintained or reinforced relative to others, yielding structural value without invoking preference, desire, or normativity.

### **$V \rightarrow M$ (Value to Meaning):**

Value becomes indexed to informational distinctions when specific differences come to matter as differences for the system's ongoing organization. Meaning, in this structural sense, arises as value organized with respect to informational distinctions rather than as semantic content.

### **$M \rightarrow P$ (Meaning to Purpose):**

Purpose arises when meaning constrains not only immediate transitions but the selection and reinforcement of meaning across ordered sequences of change. In chemotaxis, this appears as temporal asymmetry: chemical gradient meanings that successfully correlate with nutrient access are preferentially maintained across subsequent tumbling events, creating directional bias toward favorable conditions without requiring teleological anticipation.